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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 However appropriate may have been Virginia Woolf’s 
comparison of the unhappy Mrs. Dalloway to “a wheel without 
a tyre,” Plaintiff Vickie Thorne considers herself aggrieved 
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despite having equipped her car with two new tires.1  Wheels 
are not an issue.  What is at issue is a federal regulation that 
requires a tire dealer to help customers register their new tires 
with the manufacturer.  That regulation was promulgated under 
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 49 
U.S.C. § 30101, et seq. (“the Act”), and the Act’s stated pur-
pose is to reduce traffic accidents and their consequent human 
toll.  Thorne’s appeal turns on whether she can sue her tire 
dealer for ignoring its regulatory tire registration obligation.   
The regulation prescribes three methods for tire dealers 
like Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack Inc. to help register a 
buyer’s tires.  According to Thorne, Pep Boys failed to pursue 
any of the three when, or after, it sold her the tires.  So she sued 
on behalf of a class of Pep Boys customers who similarly 
received no tire registration assistance.  But Thorne’s suit skid-
ded to a halt when the District Court dismissed her complaint 
without leave to amend.  The Court held that a dealer’s failure 
to help register a buyer’s tires in one of the three prescribed 
ways does not, by itself, create an injury in fact for purposes of 
Article III standing.  We agree with that ratio decidendi but, 
because a district court has no jurisdiction to rule on the merits 
when a plaintiff lacks standing, we will vacate and remand for 
the District Court to dismiss Thorne’s operative complaint 
without prejudice.    
I. BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the Act to “reduce traffic accidents and 
deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 30101; 80 Stat. 718.  Congress later amended the Act to 
 
1 Virginia Woolf, Mrs Dalloway 112 (Hogarth Press 1925).   
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require that every tire dealer unaffiliated with a tire manufac-
turer “give a registration form (containing the tire identifica-
tion number) to the first purchaser of a tire.”2  49 U.S.C. 
§ 30117(b)(2)(B).  It also required a rulemaking to obligate 
dealers to keep certain records on tire sales, including each 
buyer’s name and address and tire identification information.  
Id. § 30117(b)(3).  Rulemaking merged these two require-
ments, providing three options for tire dealers to comply with 
their registration obligations:  
(1) Give each buyer a registration form listing the tire 
identification number (“TIN”) of each tire he or she 
bought and certain contact information of the dealer, 
for the buyer to then submit to the tire manufacturer;  
 
(2) Record each buyer’s name and address, the TIN of 
each tire he or she bought, and certain contact infor-
mation for the dealer on a registration form, and mail 
it to the tire manufacturer at no charge to the buyer 
within 30 days; or 
 
(3) Electronically submit to the tire manufacturer, by 
methods it has authorized, the same information in 
(2) at no charge to the buyer within 30 days. 
See 49 C.F.R. § 574.8(a)(1)(i)–(iii).   
 Widening the lens, the Act states how it interacts with 
other laws and is enforced.  It preserves common-law causes 
 
2 We refer in this opinion to such unaffiliated dealers as simply 
“dealers.”  For purposes not relevant here, the statute distin-
guishes between “independent dealers” such as Pep Boys and 
those affiliated with tire manufacturers.    
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of action, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e), but does not confer an express 
private right of action.  See, e.g., Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
234 F.3d 514, 522–24 (11th Cir. 2000); Mulholland v. Subaru 
of Am., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1265–66 (D. Colo. 2009).  
For administrative enforcement, the Act authorizes the Secre-
tary of Transportation to decide whether a vehicle or vehicle 
equipment contains a safety-related defect or does not comply 
with minimum performance standards.  See 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 30102(a)(10), 30118(a).  Manufacturers must notify vehicle 
owners and dealers of any such defect or non-compliance, and 
the Secretary may sua sponte or on petition of an “interested 
person” hold a hearing on the sufficiency of notice.  Id. § 
30118(b), (e).  “Interested person[s]” may participate in these 
hearings.  Id.  The Attorney General may also enforce the Act 
through a federal civil lawsuit to enjoin “a violation of this 
chapter or a regulation prescribed . . . under this chapter.”  Id. 
§ 30163(a).  One who violates the Act, including the tire regis-
tration statute (§ 30117) “or a regulation prescribed thereunder, 
is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of 
not more than $21,000 for each violation.”  Id. § 30165(a)(1).  
Penalties for “a related series of violations” can reach $105 
million.  Id.   
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Thorne bought two tires from a Pep Boys store in Rich-
mond, Virginia, in January of 2017.  She claims that Pep Boys 
did not help register her tires with the manufacturer using any 
of the three prescribed methods.3   
 
3 Thorne did not specifically allege in her complaint that Pep 
Boys disregarded Option 2, under which the dealer mails a 
buyer’s completed registration form to the manufacturer.  She 
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Thorne filed a class action complaint against Pep Boys 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Pep Boys 
violated its registration obligations under 49 C.F.R. § 574.8 
and thus was liable to her on federal and state-law causes of 
action.  Pep Boys moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The 
District Court determined that Thorne failed to allege a con-
crete injury in fact, dismissing her complaint without prejudice 
for lack of Article III standing.   
Thorne then filed an amended class action complaint, 
bringing eight causes of action under federal warranty and state 
law.4  She sought money damages, restitution, injunctive relief, 
and attorneys’ fees.  Pep Boys, she alleged, deprived her of the 
benefit of the bargain when it sold her tires without helping to 
register them because unregistered tires are worth less than 
registered tires.  Thorne alternatively alleged intangible harm 
because her unregistered tires increase the risk to her person or 
property if she is unreachable upon her tires’ recall.  She did 
 
alleged that she “was not handed a tire-registration form by Pep 
Boys,” and her “invoice [did not] indicate that Pep Boys trans-
mitted the federally-required information directly to the tire 
manufacturer.”  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 53.  She generally 
alleged that Pep Boys violated its registration obligations and 
that her tires went unregistered, so we take her to be claiming 
that Pep Boys did not perform Option 2 either.  For purposes 
of this appeal, Pep Boys does not claim to practice any of the 
three tire registration methods. 
   
4 Thorne’s operative complaint seems to implicate Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3), though it cites 
neither.   
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not allege any performance problems, physical defects, or 
recall associated with her tires. 
After Pep Boys again moved to dismiss, the District 
Court dismissed Thorne’s amended complaint on Article III 
standing grounds.  The District Court held that Thorne failed 
to sufficiently plead tangible financial harm because, as a 
matter of law, she did not bargain for compliance with the 
registration regulation.  It also concluded that her alleged 
intangible harm was speculative and insufficiently concrete 
absent a recall of her tires.  Citing Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 
918 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2019), the District Court held that 
violation of 49 C.F.R. § 574.8’s record-keeping requirement 
alone does not produce an injury in fact.  This time, dismissal 
did not provide leave to amend.   
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 
the dismissal of Thorne’s amended complaint.  A North Caro-
lina resident, Thorne invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) to ground 
the District Court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction over her 
putative class action against Philadelphia-based Pep Boys.   
But the District Court lacked jurisdiction if Thorne 
couldn’t establish Article III standing.  See In re Schering 
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Cons. Class Act., 678 F.3d 235, 
243 (3d Cir. 2012).  Constitutional standing, which is properly 
tested under Rule 12(b)(1), may be challenged facially or fac-
tually.  A facial challenge argues that the plaintiff’s factual 
allegations cannot meet the elements of standing.  Schering 
Plough, 678 F.3d at 243; see also In re Horizon Healthcare 
Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 
2017).  Because that was the nub of Pep Boys’s Rule 12(b)(1) 
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motion, we take Thorne’s factual allegations as true, view them 
in her favor, and perform a plenary review of the dismissal.  
See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 632.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
Derived from separation-of-powers principles, the law 
of standing “serves to prevent the judicial process from being 
used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”  Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).  Article III of 
our Constitution vests “[t]he judicial Power of the United 
States” in both the Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts as 
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.  This “judicial [p]ower” extends only 
to “Cases” and “Controversies.”  Id. art. III, § 2; see also 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  To assure 
that judges avoid rendering impermissible advisory opinions, 
parties seeking to invoke federal judicial power must first 
establish their standing to do so.  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.    
The familiar elements of Article III standing require a 
plaintiff to have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  
Id. at 1547.  Injury in fact is the “‘foremost’ of standing’s three 
elements”—and the one element at issue in this appeal.  Id. 
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 
83, 103 (1998)).  To plead an injury in fact, the party invoking 
federal jurisdiction must establish three sub-elements: first, the 
invasion of a legally protected interest; second, that the injury 
is both “concrete and particularized”; and third, that the injury 
is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see also Mielo v. Steak ’n 
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Shake Ops., 897 F.3d 467, 479 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018).  The parties 
do not dispute that Thorne has suffered invasion of a legally 
protected interest, so our injury-in-fact analysis focuses on the 
latter sub-elements.   
As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Thorne has 
the burden to establish standing “for each type of relief 
sought.”  Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 
(2009); see Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 
194 (3d Cir. 2016).  Her arguments do not differentiate 
between the remedies she seeks.  Still, we will consider her 
standing as to each remedy alleged, mindful of our task to 
“examine the allegations in the complaint from a number of 
different angles to see if [Thorne’s] purported injury can be 
framed in a way that satisfies Article III.”  See Mielo, 897 F.3d 
at 479 (quoting Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 197). 
A. Tangible Economic Injury 
A “paradigmatic form[]” of injury in fact is economic 
injury.  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 
286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005) (Alito, J.).  “Standing always should 
exist to claim damages, unless perhaps the theory of damages 
is totally fanciful.”  Id. (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3531.4, at 847 n.7 (2005 
Supp.)).  Little surprise, then, that Thorne characterizes her tire 
purchase as an economic injury.  But Thorne nowhere 
“allege[s] facts that would permit a factfinder to value the 
purported injury at something more than zero dollars without 
resorting to mere conjecture,” In re Johnson & Johnson 
Talcum Powder Prods. Litig., 903 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 
2018), so she fails to plead a theory of economic harm suffi-
cient to support standing.   
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The gravamen of Thorne’s alleged economic injury is 
that she did not receive the benefit of her bargain when she 
bought tires from Pep Boys that then went unregistered.  She 
alleged that “Class Members not only pay for the tires, but also 
pay the cost of Defendant’s compliance with federal law.”  Am. 
Class Act. Compl. ¶ 9.  And on appeal, she argues that “she 
paid Pep Boys for nondefective tires, and it instead provided 
her tires that were unregistered (because Pep Boys used none 
of the three mandated methods at the point of sale), and 
therefore the tires were defective, which is a tangible financial 
injury.”  Appellant’s Br. 16.  Thorne’s benefit-of-the-bargain 
allegations do not support a viable theory of economic injury, 
and her product-defect argument blows right by the statute’s 
defined terms.      
1. Unregistered tires not worth less than Thorne paid.  
Thorne’s benefit-of-the-bargain theory runs headlong into our 
case law.  We start with Johnson & Johnson.  There, the plain-
tiff claimed that when she bought baby powder, she was denied 
the benefit of her bargain because certain uses of the product 
“can lead” to an elevated risk of ovarian cancer.  903 F.3d at 
281–82.  Though the plaintiff might have expected “safe” baby 
powder, missing were allegations that the product was unsafe 
as to her, that she developed ovarian cancer, or that she was at 
risk of developing it as a result of using the baby powder.  Id. 
at 289.  We thus rejected the plaintiff’s benefit-of-the-bargain 
theory of injury because she “failed to allege that the economic 
benefit she received from that powder was anything less than 
the price she paid.”  Id. at 290 (emphasis in original).   
 
The same can be said for Thorne.  Though she “pair[s] 
a conclusory assertion of money lost with a request that a 
defendant pay up,” Johnson & Johnson, 903 F.3d at 288, that 
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doesn’t suffice.  Her pleadings concede that the tires she 
bought from Pep Boys are functioning as intended and haven’t 
been recalled.  Unalleged, uncertain future events do not make 
her Pep Boys tires worth less at the time of purchase than 
equivalent registered tires.  See id. at 289–90.  And Thorne’s 
thin allegation that Pep Boys prices the cost of complying with 
the registration obligation into its tires is undermined else-
where in her complaint.  For example, she formulates a sup-
posedly common class question as: “[w]hether Defendant 
includes the cost of tire-registration compliance in the price of 
its tires.”  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 65(d).  Given her mixed 
messages on compliance costs, Thorne fails to intelligibly 
allege that she paid for more than she received.5 
   
Thorne’s theory of economic harm also treads on 
Finkelman.  As relevant here, Finkelman bought tickets to the 
Super Bowl in the resale market and then sued the NFL, alleg-
ing that he paid a higher price due to the NFL’s practice of 
reserving nearly all tickets for teams and League insiders.  810 
F.3d at 190–91, 199.  We held that Finkelman’s theory of eco-
nomic injury stood on “nothing more than supposition” 
because we “ha[d] no way of knowing whether the NFL’s 
withholding of tickets would have had the effect of increasing 
or decreasing prices on the secondary market.”  Id. at 200–01.  
 
5 As bedrock for her requested injunction, Thorne alleged that 
she “and the Class members will likely purchase tires from 
Defendant again . . . and still not receive the required tire-
registration services.”  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 134.  We 
return to Johnson & Johnson: Thorne’s desire to keep buying 
Pep Boys tires at prevailing prices makes it difficult to presume 




For example, League insiders—who received their tickets for 
free—“might have been especially eager to resell their tickets,” 
meaning that the NFL’s practices may have effectively 
increased the supply and decreased the price of tickets in the 
resale market relative to a scenario in which the NFL sold more 
tickets to the public.  Id. at 200. 
                  
Like Finkelman, Thorne propounds an economic injury 
that requires speculation about market or firm-level effects.  
Were Pep Boys to comply with its registration obligations, 
market factors might lead it to increase its tire prices accord-
ingly.  As Thorne recognizes, the submission-by-buyer method 
of compliance (Option 1) does not prohibit dealers from pass-
ing on registration costs to tire buyers.  On the other hand, 
demand might be too elastic for Pep Boys to do so.  We simply 
have no way of knowing.  Rather than “application of basic 
economic logic,” Thorne’s theory of economic harm relies on 
“pure conjecture” about what Pep Boys’s prices would be if it 
“sold its [tires] differently.”  See Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 201 
(quotation omitted).    
 
We recognize that one out-of-Circuit district court deci-
sion goes the other way.  In Exum v. National Tire & Battery, 
437 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2020), a federal mag-
istrate judge reasoned that purchasers of unregistered tires 
“have arguably purchased a less valuable product” and “can 
reasonably expect that the purchase price for those tires 
includes proper tire registration.”6  Id. at 1151–52.  Exum is 
 
6 The judge in Exum declined to follow the District Court’s dis-
missal of Thorne’s original complaint based on “the specific 
allegations raised” in Exum’s complaint.  437 F. Supp. 3d at 
1152.  But the judge noted that the cases are “similar.”  Id.   
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more properly considered an intangible harm case, and we will 
treat it as such.  But it suffices here to note that Exum assigns 
economic value through mere conjecture, contrary to our Cir-
cuit’s law.  See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 903 F.3d at 285; 
Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 201.  At all events, Thorne alleges only 
that she generally expected, when buying the tires, to be 
“reachable” upon a recall, Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 55, not that 
she kicked the tires on the applicable regulations or was told at 
the point of sale that Pep Boys would take steps to help register 
the tires.7  Lack of awareness of an affirmation at the time of 
purchase generally dooms a benefit-of-the-bargain theory of 
liability.  See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 
541, 566–68 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying New Jersey law), rev’d 
on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Gross v. Stryker Corp., 
858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 501–02 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (applying Penn-
sylvania law).  We decline to adopt Exum’s economic harm 
analysis here.          
 
2. Unregistered tires not defective.  Thorne also con-
tends that we should presume suitable economic injury because 
an unregistered tire is per se defective under the Act.  Interpret-
ing the Act requires us to examine “the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.”  Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 
418, 426 (2009) (quotation omitted).  Bearing these factors in 
mind, we conclude that Thorne’s construction of the statute 
falls flat because it offends the statutory definition of “defect,” 
relies on grammatically flawed readings of related definitions, 
and would create illogical results.   
 
7 Thorne has not alleged that Pep Boys lacks access to her con-
tact information.   
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First, the Act’s definition of “defect” cannot bear the 
weight Thorne places on it.  When a statute defines a term, we 
must follow that definition and “exclude[] unstated meanings 
of that term.”  Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484 (1987) (cita-
tion omitted).  The Act defines “defect” to mean “any defect in 
performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor 
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.”  49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(3).  
The definition by its terms embraces faulty physical character-
istics, not registration (i.e., paperwork) deficiencies.  Besides, 
other provisions of the Act suggest that non-compliance is not 
synonymous with defect.  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(1) 
(“Secretary [of Transportation] may make a final decision that 
a motor vehicle or replacement equipment contains a defect 
related to motor vehicle safety or does not comply with an 
applicable motor vehicle safety standard prescribed [hereun-
der].”) (emphases added); id. § 30116(a) (“If . . . it is decided 
that the vehicle or equipment contains a defect related to motor 
vehicle safety or does not comply with applicable motor 
vehicle safety standards . . . .”) (emphases added).  The defini-
tion of “defect” and other provisions’ contemplation of that 
term seriously undermine Thorne’s reading.   
Second, we decline Thorne’s invitation to contort other 
related definitions in the Act.  According to Thorne, noncom-
pliance can amount to a defect because:  
[A] defect in original equipment or non-
compliance of original equipment with a motor 
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this 
chapter, is deemed to be a defect or non-
compliance of the motor vehicle in or on which 
the equipment was installed at the time of 
delivery to the first purchaser.   
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49 U.S.C. § 30102(b)(1)(F); Appellant’s Br. 18.  “[O]riginal 
equipment means motor vehicle equipment (including a tire) 
installed in or on a motor vehicle at the time of delivery to the 
first purchaser.”  Id. § 30102(b)(1)(C).  For one thing, the 
defined term “motor vehicle safety standard” means “a 
minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle 
equipment performance.”  Id. § 30102(a)(10).  Thorne never 
explains how deficient registration amounts to a performance 
issue.  For another, Thorne’s contention that the “first 
purchaser” of original equipment can be the first purchaser of 
a tire violates the last-antecedent rule.  See, e.g., Jama v. 
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 343 (2005) (confirm-
ing that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be 
read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately 
follows” (citation omitted)).  In the definition of “original 
equipment,” the term “first purchaser” immediately follows “a 
motor vehicle,” not “a tire.”   
 Third, Thorne’s argument would create illogical results.  
Consider that the Act sometimes regards the maker of a new 
car as the manufacturer of the car’s stock tires.  It crafts the 
following limited definition applicable to, among others, the 
tire registration subsection: “[A] manufacturer of a motor 
vehicle in or on which original equipment was installed when 
delivered to the first purchaser is deemed to be the 
manufacturer of the equipment.”  49 U.S.C. § 30102(b)(1)(G).  
But Thorne’s interpretation of “original equipment” and “first 
purchaser” would mean that the manufacturer of a tire buyer’s 
vehicle is considered the manufacturer of her replacement tires.  
Intuitively, and considered against the balance of the statute, 
such a result is absurd.  “A basic principle of statutory 
construction is that we should avoid a statutory interpretation 
that leads to absurd results.”  In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 
16 
 
456 F.3d 328, 330 (3d Cir. 2006).  We read the Act to more 
sensibly treat aftermarket tires as “replacement equipment”—
“motor vehicle equipment (including a tire) that is not original 
equipment.”  49 U.S.C. § 30102(b)(1)(D).8    
* * * 
 We conclude that Thorne has not alleged a tangible, 
economic injury that is sufficient for standing purposes.  She 
has supported her benefit-of-the-bargain theory of injury with 
only speculative allegations that the tires she received from Pep 
Boys were worth less than what she paid for them.  And her 
argument that unregistered tires are defective such that we may 
presume standing-worthy economic harm rests on a flawed 
reading of the Act.  Because we reach this conclusion on de 
novo review, Thorne’s argument that the District Court made 
erroneous factual findings is of no consequence.9  We next 
 
8 Betraying her arguments on appeal, Thorne pleaded that “44 
million original equipment tires for new passenger vehicles 
and 201.6 million replacement tires for passenger vehicles” 
were sold in 2013.  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 20 (emphases 
added).   
 
9 Thorne also argues that the District Court should not have 
required her to “‘allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.’”  Appellant’s Br. 37 (quoting Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1549).  That’s true as far as it goes.  But the 
“additional harm” admonition “clearly presumes that the 
putative plaintiff had already suffered a de facto injury 
resulting from the procedural violation.”  Owner-Operator 
Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 
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analyze Thorne’s standing under the Spokeo framework gov-
erning intangible injuries.   
B. Intangible Yet Concrete Injury 
Intangible injuries sometimes qualify as concrete.  To 
determine whether that’s the case here, we analyze Thorne’s 
claim to standing by searching for evidence (a) of a close rela-
tionship between the lack of tire registration and a harm histor-
ically recognized as a basis for common-law suits and (b) that 
Congress elevated the lack of tire registration to a legally cog-
nizable, concrete injury.  See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.  Our 
Court has yet to decide whether a plaintiff must prevail on both 
inquiries, or if demonstrating just one is sufficient.  See, e.g., 
Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 351 (3d Cir. 
2017) (declining to decide whether intangible injury that does 
not satisfy both congressional and historical inquiries can be 
concrete); Horizon, 846 F.3d at 637 (suggesting that satisfac-
tion of historical inquiry alone “is likely to be sufficient to 
satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing”).  Yet we need 
not reach that question today.  Thorne does not have the better 
of either argument.  
1. No historical analogue.  Thorne alleges two forms 
of intangible harm: the denial of tire registration assistance in 
itself, and the materially increased risk of an accident were she 
unreachable due to the lack of registration upon a recall of her 
tires.  Though precedent does not require us to identify an exact 
historical analogue that could remedy the alleged harm, “we 
 
343 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  As we explain below, because the regu-
latory violation Thorne alleges is not itself a concrete injury, 
the language from Spokeo gets no traction here.  See Kamal, 
918 F.3d at 115.       
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still require [that] the harm be ‘of the same character of 
previously existing “legally cognizable injuries.”’”  Kamal, 
918 F.3d at 114 (quoting Susinno, 862 F.3d at 352).  Thorne 
suggests two historical analogues as remedies for her alleged 
harms: negligence per se and products liability.10  Neither sug-
gestion is persuasive.11  
 
10 Although Thorne tries to draw a historical line to statutory 
consumer protection actions, statutory actions ipso facto fall 
outside common law.   
 
11 Thorne contends that she “argued below that her alleged 
harms bear a close relationship to traditional torts allowing 
consumers to sue over their purchase of defective products.”  
Appellant’s Br. 22 (citing ECF No. 29 at 10–11).  But her 
argument to the District Court was cursory, contending only 
that “exposure to and harm from dangerous products” was tra-
ditionally a basis for suit in English and American courts.  ECF 
No. 29 at 11.  Her historical arguments are so fleeting that we 
could consider them forfeited.  See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Public 
Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 
945 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that argument supported only by 
“conclusory assertions” in opening and reply brief was 
waived); Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived 
unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those 
purposes ‘a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice . . 
. .’”) (quotation omitted).  But we perceive no prejudice to Pep 
Boys from engaging with the merits of Thorne’s undeveloped 
arguments and, given the countervailing authority, we choose 
to address them on the merits.  AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia 
Cas. Co., 562 F.3d 213, 223 n.3 (3d Cir. 2009).    
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As for negligence per se, that doctrine is not a historical 
recognition of either of Thorne’s alleged harms.  It merely 
“establishes, by reference to a statutory scheme, the standard 
of care appropriate to the underlying tort.”  In re Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 
1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  It permits a fact-
finder to consider the violation of a statute or ordinance as 
evidence of negligence.  Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 975 F.2d 
1009, 1015 (3d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993).  
But a plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine to transform statutory 
violations into proof of “liability for a separate underlying 
tort.”  Bone Screw, 193 F.3d at 791 (rejecting argument that 
“violations themselves form a cause of action”).  Nor does neg-
ligence per se obviate the need to show proximate causation or 
damages.  See Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 
990, 998 (11th Cir. 2020) (Katsas, J., sitting by designation) 
(concluding that proffered historical tort analogues had “no 
relationship to harms traditionally remediable in American or 
English courts” because plaintiffs “jettison[ed] the bedrock 
elements of reliance and damages”).  Negligence per se might 
help Thorne prove Pep Boys’s breach of a standard of care if a 
tort action would otherwise lie at common law.  But it says 
nothing about that standing-critical “if” question: whether any 
alleged harm caused by the breach could be remedied at com-
mon law.     
Nor does Thorne’s products-liability analogue resonate 
with us.  Though she cites no specific regime, strict liability for 
defective products (at least in Pennsylvania, where Pep Boys 
is headquartered and Thorne sued) requires that “physical harm 
[be] caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his 
property.”  RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS § 402A, as adopted 
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in Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966).  Without phys-
ical harm, neither of Thorne’s alleged injuries bears a close 
relationship to harms that products-liability torts have histori-
cally remedied.  Compare Kamal, 918 F.3d at 114 (determin-
ing that FACTA violation did not share close relationship with 
tort suits for unreasonable publicity or breach of confidence 
absent “disclosure to a third party”), with Susinno, 862 F.3d at 
351–52 (noting that Congress “squarely identified” the harm 
of pre-recorded calls to cell phones and that such harm is 
“closely relate[d]” to common-law claim for intrusion upon 
seclusion).      
2. No evidence of Congress elevating either alleged 
harm.  Congress is “well positioned to identify intangible 
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements,” Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1549, so we also consider whether it “expressed 
an intent to make [the] injury redressable.”  Horizon, 846 F.3d 
at 637.  Thorne maintains that the Act’s purpose of preventing 
accidents and injuries on the roadways validates private actions 
to enforce the tire registration requirements.  The tire registra-
tion provisions for independent dealers do not identify their 
purpose.  But what we glean from those provisions and from 
the statutory regime as a whole persuades us that Congress did 
not intend to give private attorneys general standing to redress 
the “injury” of unregistered tires.  
 
First, the titles given to sections of the tire registration 
regulation and the relevant provision of the Act suggest that 
their purpose is information-gathering for recordkeeping.  The 
title of a statute and the heading of a section are “tools available 
for the resolution of [] doubt” about the meaning of a statute.  
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) 
(quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 419, 
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528–29 (1947)).  Here, the title of the tire registration regula-
tion is “information requirements,” 49 C.F.R. § 574.8, and the 
enabling statute is titled “[p]roviding information to, and 
maintaining records on, purchasers.”  49 U.S.C. § 30117.  
Thorne impugns the District Court’s characterization of the 
regulation as a “procedural record-keeping statute,” Appel-
lant’s Br. 23, but that description is apt.  Facially, these laws 
bear no direct relation to the Act’s safety purposes.   
  
Second, by connecting its safety goals to vehicle perfor-
mance, the Act as a whole suggests no congressional intent to 
transmogrify the lack of registered tires into a concrete injury.  
In Chapter 301 of Title 49, entitled “Motor Vehicle Safety,” 
Congress recognized the need “to prescribe motor vehicle 
safety standards” in an effort “to reduce traffic accidents and 
deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents.”  49 U.S.C. 
§ 30101; accord Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 
F.2d 777, 781–82 (3d Cir. 1992).  We emphasize that the Act 
defines “motor vehicle safety standard” as a minimum 
“performance” standard.  49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(10).  The defi-
nition of “motor vehicle safety” is likewise performance-
focused, referring to “design, construction, or performance” of 
a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.  Id. § 30102(a)(9).  
Tires that suffer from no performance problems but are simply 
unregistered do not implicate the Act’s purpose.       
 
Third, the Act appears to favor public over private 
enforcement, both generally and as relevant to tire registration.  
It authorizes the Attorney General to sue in federal court to 
enjoin violations and levy civil penalties ranging from $21,000 
to $105 million on those who violate the tire registration sec-
tion “or a regulation prescribed thereunder.”  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 
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30163(a), 30165(a)(1).  The Act also contains an administra-
tive enforcement scheme under which the Secretary of Trans-
portation “require[s]” dealers to register tires, and may conduct 
hearings on certain notice-related compliance issues in which 
“interested person[s]” may participate.  Id. §§ 30117(b)(2)(B), 
30118(e).  By contrast, the Act is silent on private enforcement 
of the tire registration regime, only broadly preserving 
common-law liability for non-compliance with (performance-
based) motor vehicle safety standards.12  Id. § 30103(e).  In 
fact, this silence may have been purposeful; elsewhere the Act 
contemplates private-party vindication of rights.  See, e.g., 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here 
Congress includes particular language in one section of a 
statute but omits it in another . . . , it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.”) (quotation omitted).  For example, in 
the section immediately preceding the tire registration provi-
sion, the Act does set forth a private cause of action for a dis-
tributor or dealer to sue a manufacturer in federal district court 
over the value of certain parts or equipment.  Id. § 30116(c) 
(establishing statute of limitations and remedies).  If the Act 
reveals any relevant congressional judgment, it is to prioritize 
public enforcement over private redress for the “injury” of 
unregistered tires.   
 
12 The lack of an express private right of action to sue for defi-
cient tire registration, alone, is not what drives our standing 
analysis.  Even when a plaintiff leverages a duty created by one 
statute to sue under other laws, an express private right of 
action in the duty-generating statute is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for standing.  See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96 
(“[T]he nonexistence of a cause of action was no proper basis 
for a jurisdictional dismissal.”).   
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Thorne argues that committee reports and a consumer 
advocate’s Congressional testimony exhibit a connection 
between tire registration and vehicle safety.  But those non-
statutory data points fail to show that the congressional inquiry 
favors standing.  Viewed at a high level of generality, every 
provision in a statute will relate to its overarching purpose.  The 
real question is whether the alleged statutory violation is 
among the concrete harms Congress enacted the law to rem-
edy.  See, e.g., Trichell, 964 F.3d at 999 (“[T]he harms against 
which the statute is directed [abusive debt collection] . . . . are 
a far cry from whatever injury one may suffer from receiving 
in the mail a misleading communication that fails to mislead.”) 
(internal quotation omitted); Kamal, 918 F.3d at 115 (“[T]he 
FACTA provision [violation of which did not confer standing] 
was part of Congress’s effort to prevent the concrete harm of 
identity theft.”).  Congress may have adopted tire registration 
procedures to decrease the risk of harm to concrete safety 
interests, but “[a] violation of one of th[ose] procedural 
requirements may result in no [such concrete] harm.”  Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1550; see also Kamal, 918 F.3d at 117.  The Act 
gives us no reason to conclude—but does provide reason to 
doubt—that Congress elevated the lack of tire registration into 
an injury that is concrete for Article III purposes.    
 
* *  * 
 
Given the attenuation between lack of tire registration 
and the Act’s purpose of reducing accidents, deaths, and inju-
ries, only a definitive congressional judgment to elevate the 
former into a concrete injury would favor Article III standing 
under Spokeo’s congressional inquiry.  Thorne points to noth-
ing that would aid her cause.  In fact, the statute’s titles, defined 
terms, and enforcement provisions suggest the opposite.   
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C. Speculative Injury 
 
Even were we to assume that Thorne’s alleged injury is 
sufficiently concrete, we must still address the third prong of 
injury-in-fact analysis—whether an alleged harm, even if con-
crete, is hypothetical or conjectural.  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1548; Johnson & Johnson, 903 F.3d at 284.  This element is 
intended to weed out claims that are nothing “more than an 
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.”  United 
States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procs. (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669, 688–89 (1973); see also Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 
874 F.3d 154, 168 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 
Only Thorne’s second alleged injury—an increased risk 
of harm to property or person if her unregistered tires are 
recalled—fits within this framework.  To be sure, a “risk of real 
harm” may “satisfy the requirement of concreteness.”  Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1549.  But the “threatened injury must be certainly 
impending to constitute injury in fact.”  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 
409.  And there must be at least a “‘substantial risk’ that the 
harm will occur.”  Id. at 414 n.5 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–54 (2010)). Thorne 
posits only an infinitesimal increase in her chances of being 
injured because of Pep Boys’s failure to register her tires, so 
any risk of harm—even if concrete—is no more than specula-
tive.    
 
In Thorne’s telling, Pep Boys’s failure to register her 
tires increased her risk of harm because, if the tire manufac-
turer recalls her tires, it will be unable to contact her.  That, she 
contends, could lead to her continuing to drive on the recalled 
tires and having an accident attributable to the defect that 
prompted the recall.  But, as in Kamal, this threat consists of a 
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highly speculative chain of future events that does not consti-
tute a material risk of harm.  918 F.3d at 116.  For the threat-
ened harm to transpire, the following independent events 
would need to occur: 
 
1) The manufacturer discovers that a collec-
tion of tires, a subset of which Thorne 
bought from Pep Boys, contains a defect 
able to cause property damage or personal 
injury. 
 
2) The manufacturer recalls the tires.  
 
3) Thorne is still driving on the tires at the 
time of recall.  
 
4) Thorne is otherwise still reachable from 
the information that should have been rec-
orded on the registration form at the time 
of purchase.  
 
5) Pep Boys, upon learning of the recall, 
does not supply the manufacturer with 
Thorne’s contact information.  
 
6) Thorne does not learn of the recall 
through other channels, such as media or 
consumer reports.   
 
7) The defect prompting the recall causes 
Thorne to have an accident.  
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This threatened injury is not “certainly impending,” nor 
does it present a “substantial risk.”  Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 
414 n.5.  This chain of conceivable events poses some new 
non-zero risk to Thorne, but her absolute chances of harm are 
miniscule.  See Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1621 
(2020) (citing Clapper for proposition that challenged act must 
have “substantially increased the risk” of harm to plaintiff).  In 
other words, relative increase cannot be the measuring stick 
because whenever the plaintiff was at zero risk before the 
defendant acted, the percentage increase in her chances of 
harm is “infinite.”  Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1001 n.4.  Without 
announcing where in the logical chain a concrete injury 
becomes too attenuated, we conclude that Thorne’s alleged 
“‘at-risk’ . . . status” is too speculative to support standing.  
Perelman v. Perelman, 793 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 2015) (no 
standing to sue over risk of default on retirement obligations 
where plan’s assets exceeded liabilities under accepted 
accounting method).       
 
 The authority Thorne musters does not compel a differ-
ent conclusion.  In DiNaples v. MRS BPO, LLC, 934 F.3d 275 
(3d Cir. 2019), the defendant allegedly violated the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by printing on the outside 
of a debt collection letter a Quick Response code that, when 
scanned, revealed the plaintiff’s account number.  Id. at 278.  
We rejected the argument that a third party would first have to 
access and understand the disclosed information before the 
plaintiff could have standing.  The FDCPA takes aim at the 
harm of privacy violations, and the chain of future events that 
would produce that harm only required one step: a third party 
scanning the code.  For Thorne’s future injury to occur, by con-
trast, up to seven steps must be daisy chained.     
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Nor do our data breach and privacy cases assist Thorne.  
Horizon dealt with the plaintiffs’ standing to sue Horizon under 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) after unencrypted lap-
tops containing their personal information were stolen from 
one of the company’s facilities.  846 F.3d at 632.  Congress in 
the FCRA identified as a cognizable injury unauthorized dis-
semination of personal information—harm closely related to 
invasion of privacy, which traditionally was a basis for a 
common-law suit.13  Id. at 639–40.  Rejecting the argument 
that the harm was too speculative, the Horizon court noted that 
“[t]he theft appears to have been directed towards the 
acquisition of such personal information,” the laptops were un-
encrypted, and one plaintiff had been a victim of identity theft 
as a result of the breach.  Id. at 639 n.19.  Horizon, in which a 
malicious actor accessed the plaintiffs’ protected personal 
information and committed identity theft, is a far cry from the 
case before us.      
 
Similarly unavailing is Long v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 
903 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 2018).  The Long plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendant, first, did not send them copies of their back-
ground checks before deciding not to hire them based on those 
background checks and, second, did not send them notices of 
their rights under the FCRA.  Id. at 317.  We held that the first 
 
13 St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 898 
F.3d 351 (3d Cir. 2018), which Thorne’s counsel cited at oral 
argument, has no purchase here for similar reasons.  See id. at 
357–58 (holding that exposure of plaintiff’s credit account 
number through envelope window of debt collection letter 
“‘implicate[d] a core concern animating the FDCPA—the 
invasion of privacy’—and thus [wa]s closely related to” a tra-
ditional harm).     
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alleged harm was sufficiently concrete: Suffering adverse 
employment action without the required consumer report was 
the very harm that Congress sought to prevent, and interference 
with the plaintiffs’ ability to control their personal information 
was analogous to common-law invasion of privacy.  Id. at 323–
24.  But the second alleged injury—lack of FCRA-required 
notice—was a bare procedural violation for which there was 
no standing.  Id. at 325.  We rejected the argument that the 
violation increased the risk that the plaintiffs’ claims would 
lapse before they could sue.  Id.  Thorne’s alleged harm from 
unregistered tires resembles the Long plaintiffs’ second 
claimed injury much more than their first.     
 
Finally, we acknowledge Exum’s decision that tire pur-
chasers had Article III standing to sue for a dealer’s failure to 
comply with the tire registration requirement.  But the Exum 
opinion does not consider the level of attenuation in the logical 
chain from the lack of tire registration to property damage or a 
human toll.  Instead, the judge’s analysis ended with the deter-
mination that lack of tire registration increased the risk that a 
manufacturer would be unable to contact the owner of an 
unregistered tire about a recall.  437 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.  But 
nothing in the Act suggests that the relevant congressional 
interest is contact with a tire owner.  Instead, Congress was 
concerned with safe design, operation, and performance of 
motor vehicles.  Exum’s rationale is unpersuasive.   
 
* * * 
 
If Pep Boys shirked its tire registration obligations, it 
committed only a “bare procedural violation” that caused nei-
ther actual harm nor a concrete material risk of harm.  Even if 
Thorne’s alleged harm associated with a future recall of her 
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tires were concrete, her risk of actual injury is too speculative 
for Article III standing purposes.  Thorne’s allegations fail to 
establish an injury in fact, and so the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction over her claims for money damages.   
 
D. Other Remedies  
Thorne also sought “equitable relief including restitu-
tion and/or disgorgement” of revenues and profits Pep Boys 
obtained through its conduct.  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 113.  
And she requested injunctive relief to “prevent[] Defendant 
from selling unregistered tires or tires without registering those 
tires with the manufacturer or providing registration cards to 
consumers.”  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 136.  Thorne arguably 
forfeited her standing to seek those remedies because she pre-
sented only arguments in support of money damages.  See 
supra note 11.  Yet her operative complaint does allege facts 
targeted at restitution and injunctive relief, so we will consider 
her standing vel non for these remedies on the merits.  Mielo, 
897 F.3d at 479.  Because Johnson & Johnson is instructive, 
and we see no need to reinvent the wheel, we conclude that 
Thorne again lacks standing.  
1. No standing to seek restitution or disgorgement.  
Assuming Thorne can seek these remedies when she herself 
suffered no financial loss, the allegations supporting her 
request for restitution are conclusory and hinge on mere con-
jecture.  She alleges that Pep Boys ignores its tire registration 
obligations to spend more time selling tires and is unjustly 
enriched by sales made during “the time it would have taken to 
register Class Members’ tires.”  Am. Class Act. Compl. ¶ 8; 
accord id. ¶¶ 46, 103, 108–13.  But standing doesn’t flow from 
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mere suspicion that a defendant made more money by alleg-
edly shirking a legal obligation.  To take just one example, the 
Johnson & Johnson plaintiff premised her restitution claim on 
allegations that the defendant managed to sell more baby pow-
der than it would have had it properly informed consumers 
about the safety risks.  903 F.3d at 291.  We saw no standing 
for two reasons that obtain here as well.  First, the plaintiff 
failed to allege facts that would permit the conclusion that 
Johnson & Johnson made more sales than it would have.  903 
F.3d at 292.  That’s also true of Thorne’s allegations insofar as 
they offer nothing to ground her suspicion of ill-gotten gains, 
such as how long it would take Pep Boys to provide the 
required tire registration service relative to the total time 
required to consummate a tire sale.  Second, both there and 
here, the plaintiff’s theory of restitution belies her willingness, 
or the willingness of others, to buy the product despite aware-
ness of the alleged risks.  Id. at 291 & n.18; see Am. Class Act. 
Compl. ¶ 134 (“Plaintiff and the Class members will likely 
purchase tires from Defendant again or have the tires serviced, 
and still not receive the required tire-registration services.”).  
We determine that Thorne lacks standing to seek restitution or 
disgorgement.     
 
2.  No standing to seek injunctive relief.  Thorne prem-
ised her plea for injunctive relief on her allegation that she and 
other putative class members will purchase tires at Pep Boys 
again without receiving the required tire registration assis-
tance.  But we must “afford[] [Thorne] the dignity of assuming 
that she acts rationally, and that she will not act in such a way 
that she will again suffer the same alleged ‘injury.’”  See 
Johnson & Johnson, 903 F.3d at 293.  “Pleading a lack of self-
restraint may elicit sympathy but it will not typically invoke 
the jurisdiction of a federal court.”  McNair v. Synapse Grp. 
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Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 225 n.13 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because her alle-
gations reveal that she knows of Pep Boys’s practices, 
Thorne’s request for injunctive relief amounts to a “‘stop me 
before I buy again’ claim” that precludes Article III standing.  
Johnson & Johnson, 903 F.3d at 292–93.  We thus conclude 
that Thorne lacks standing to seek injunctive relief.  
 
E. Dismissal  
One final matter warrants our attention.  The District 
Court dismissed Thorne’s original complaint without preju-
dice, while dismissing her amended complaint “without leave 
to amend.”  JA16 & n.2.  That disposition was incorrect.  Dis-
missal for lack of standing reflects a lack of jurisdiction, so 
dismissal of Thorne’s amended complaint should have been 
without prejudice.  See, e.g., Kamal, 918 F.3d at 119 (vacating 
with-prejudice dismissal of amended complaint and remanding 
for without-prejudice dismissal); Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 164 n.7 
(“Because the absence of standing leaves the court without 
subject matter jurisdiction to reach a decision on the merits, 
dismissals ‘with prejudice’ for lack of standing are generally 
improper.”) (citing Korvettes, Inc. v. Brous, 617 F.2d 1021, 
1024 (3d Cir. 1980).   
Pep Boys is wary of Thorne filing more standing-free 
complaints, but we have no reason to question the profession-
alism or good faith of Thorne’s counsel.  And, of course, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 always serves as a check 
against abuse of the litigation process.  The specter of serial 
litigation cannot imbue the District Court with jurisdiction it 





Thorne has no tangible, concrete injury because she 
hasn’t specified how to value her alleged harm, why the tires 
she received were worth less than she paid for them, or how 
non-compliant tires are defective under the Act.  Nor has she 
met the Article III standing requirements for intangible, con-
crete harms.  Thorne hasn’t shown a common-law analogue to 
either of her alleged harms.  And neither the Act nor applicable 
standing caselaw suggests that Congress intended to repose 
authority in private attorneys general to enforce the tire regis-
tration regime.  Even if Thorne could show an intangible but 
concrete injury, the chain of events necessary for any harm to 
materialize is speculative.   
While we uphold the reasoning of the District Court in 
dismissing Thorne’s operative complaint, we will vacate and 
remand for a without-prejudice dismissal. 
